Bukele’s Prisons at Trump’s Disposal
Of the three, Bukele has established the closest rapport with Trump, a major shift from the suspicion with which he was viewed by the Biden administration.
Bukele was elected as El Salvador’s president in 2019, pledging to end the country’s intolerable levels of violence. His solution was the massive militarization of law enforcement and the creation of a huge “anti-terrorist” prison in which tens of thousands of persons have been held without any semblance of due process. he sent troops into El Salvador’s Congress, intimidating it into passing his budget, and forced the replacement of the attorney general and five Supreme Court judges, while harassing critical journalists.
The Biden administration sharply criticized El Salvador’s democratic slippage and imposed sanctions on several of Bukele’s associates for corruption. But Bukele remains popular in El Salvador, where the public is prepared to accept the trade-off of a vastly improved security situation for loss of civil liberties.
Trump, while out of office, was initially critical, and in a 2024 speech he asserted that Bukele was “sending all his criminals, his drug dealers, his people that are in jails, he’s sending them all to the United States.” Bukele got the message. After Trump, now back in office, ramped up removals of illegal immigrants, Bukele agreed to accept flights of deportees and place them in his massive prison. Bukele has also received third country nationals from the United States, including Venezuelans accused of being in the “Tren de Aragua” criminal organization.
Unlike Biden, Trump has made no effort to push back on his authoritarian practices as shown by the recent detention of human rights activist Ruth López which prompted only pro forma expressions of concern from the Department of State. Bukele is the only Latin American leader to have been formally received at the White House since Trump’s return, where Trump praised him, stating: “You are helping us and we appreciate it.” Donald Trump, Jr. attended Bukele’s second inaugural.
Bukele remains very much in favor in Trump’s Washington, and Donald Trump, Jr. attended Bukele’s second inaugural. But there are reports that Bukele has made deals which allow gangs to continue criminal activity such as participation in international narcotics trafficking in exchange for their acquiescence in his mass incarceration of street level criminals.
Milei Joins the War on “Woke”
Javier Milei’s libertarian ideology initially made him a marginal figure in Argentine politics. However, increasing frustration with economic decay led Argentines to give him a chance at power. Since taking office in early 2024, his tough spending cuts have brought Argentina success in taming inflation, but Argentines feel the pain of his austerity program;
Milei, like Bukele, has sought to cultivate Trump, based on a shared “outsider” profile. They met at a CPAC (Conservative Political Action Conference) event in February of 2024 and again in November of 2024 at Mar-a-Lago, where Milei termed Trump’s return to office as “the greatest political comeback in history” and in turn was praised as “a MAGA person” by Trump. He attended Trump’s second inaugural in Washington and maintains links with figures in Trump’s orbit such as Steve Bannon, who has said “we love him,” and Elon Musk, to whom Milei gave a chainsaw—the symbol of his campaign to shrink the state—at the 2025 CPAC event.
Trump’s and Milei’s economic views are in many ways quite different. As a libertarian Milei is a believer in free trade, while Trump detests it. Milei has urged creation of a US-Argentina free trade agreement to no avail and has not even been able to get negotiations underway to limit the impact of Trump’s current tariffs.
But Milei has aligned himself with Trump in other areas. Milei views himself as a leader of the global right, along with Italy’s Giorgia Meloni and Hungary’s Viktor Orban. He followed the United States in withdrawing from the World Health Organization and has raised the possibility of withdrawing from the Paris climate change accord. At the United Nations he joined with the United States in opposing a resolution calling for Russian withdrawal from Ukraine. And he has become ever more strident in denunciations of anything smacking of “woke” positions in areas such as abortion and “gender ideology.”
Under Trump, the United States has been helpful to Argentina in one area, its negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). When the latest deal providing Argentina with $20 billion in fresh funding was concluded, the Argentine press was quick to attribute success to the Milei-Trump relationship. Unquestionably, the latest loan could not have gone forward without US support.
However, Milei has been relentless in economic reform efforts, unlike his feckless predecessors, and thus the country has credibility with the IMF quite independent of US ties. He did benefit from a key gesture from the Trump administration, with the visit of Treasury Secretary Bessent, which helped calm markets at a time when the Fund’s latest loan had yet to materialize. But it is worth noting that despite some ideological distance, the Biden administration also was generally helpful to Argentina under Milei.
Bolsonaro Needs Help
Former army captain Jair Bolsonaro, whose 2019-22 term as Brazil’s President overlapped with Trump’s first term, now faces criminal charges over his alleged involvement in coup plotting after his failed re-election bid. When in power, he had forged a close relationship with Trump and relished being known as “the Trump of the tropics.”
He was received at the White House, where he spoke of a shared commitment to “traditional family lifestyles (and) respect to God our creator against the gender ideology or the politically correct attitudes.” There was also some genuine, if modest, substance to the Trump-Bolsonaro relationship: an agreement which liberalized two-way agricultural trade, access for the United States to Brazil’s space launch facility, and the largely symbolic designation of Brazil as a “Major Non-NATO Ally.”
Relations cooled under the Biden administration, which disliked Bolsonaro’s authoritarian tendencies and his hostility toward environmental measures and indigenous rights. He ran for re-election in 2022, but faced a strong opponent in former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva together with a soft post-COVID economy. As the election drew near, there was fear in Washington that Bolsonaro, who had openly admired past Brazil’s military governments, would not respect an adverse outcome. Defense Secretary Austin and CIA Director Burns used visits to Brazil to underscore the military’s need to respect the democratic process.
After Lula’s victory, protests broke out, culminating in the seizure of key government buildings in Brasilia by a mob hostile to Lula. Evidence surfaced that some senior officers had been involved—with Bolsonaro’s connivance or at least awareness—in plotting a military takeover. Since then, these officers, together with Bolsonaro himself, have been subjected to criminal proceedings aggressively pursued by Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes. If convicted, Bolsonaro could face ineligibility to run for president in the next election in 2026 and even a prison sentence.
Bolsonaro’s son Eduardo has gone to the United States to seek American support for an amnesty for all involved in the alleged coup plotting, and Brazil’s Congress is debating such an amnesty, though it has not prospered so far.
There are reports that the US is considering imposing sanctions on Justice de Moraes under the Magnitsky Act (affecting banks where he maintains accounts) and visa restrictions. This has come as he has imposed fines on Elon Musk’s X platform and on Rumble, a platform especially favored in far right circles. But while the Trump administration may be able to make de Moraes’ life more difficult, it seems unlikely that such steps would derail the case against Bolsonaro.
The Limits of Friendship
Other Latin American conservative leaders would like links with Trump. Ecuador’s Daniel Noboa, like Bukele, campaigned on a promise to deal with surging violence, and then put troops on the street and made mass arrests. When he ran for re-election in 2025, he met with Trump at Mar-a-Lago shortly ahead of the runoff vote. He has offered to allow the US to base counternarcotics surveillance aircraft in Ecuador, as was done until it was banned in 2009. But Noboa has also made clear his unwillingness to follow Bukele in accepting deportees from third countries.
As for Panama’s José Raúl Mulino, Trump’s threats to retake control of the Panama Canal have left him in damage control mode. He has defused tensions by not renewing the contracts of Chinese firms to operate port facilities, but the relationship is likely to remained strained, especially as the Trump administration has reportedly cancelled the visas of former Panamanian presidents and other prominent figures.
The relationship between Trump and the populist right in Latin America is a mix of ideology and national interests on both sides (and self interest in the case of Bolsonaro). Trump and those in his circle seem attracted to the idea of a global movement against traditional center-left establishment politics. Latin America is a region like Eastern Europe where this has gotten some traction.
Trump’s agenda prominently includes clamping down on illegal immigration from Latin America. Of the three leaders, relations with Bukele seem strongest since he is the one most willing to help on this American priority. As long as El Salvador’s prisons are available for deportees from the United States, Bukele is likely to enjoy a privileged place in Washington.
The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: https://jstribune.com/sanders-trump-and-the-latin-american-right/
Trump y la derecha latinoamericana: ideología e intereses
Las cárceles de Bukele, al servicio de Trump
De los tres, Bukele es quien ha fraguado la relación más estrecha con Trump, un giro radical respecto de la suspicacia con que lo miraba la administración Biden.
Electo en 2019 con la promesa de sofocar la violencia insoportable de El Salvador, Bukele militarizó la seguridad pública y erigió una megacárcel “antiterrorista” donde decenas de miles de personas están detenidas sin la más mínima garantía procesal. También hizo que las Fuerzas Armadas irrumpieran en la Asamblea Legislativa para imponer su presupuesto, destituyó al fiscal general y a cinco magistrados de la Corte Suprema y emprendió una campaña de acoso contra la prensa crítica.
La Casa Blanca de Biden denunció con dureza el retroceso democrático y sancionó a varios colaboradores de Bukele por corrupción. No obstante, el mandatario conserva una popularidad notable: la sociedad salvadoreña está dispuesta a canjear libertades civiles por seguridad.
Trump, todavía fuera del poder, lo criticó en un discurso de 2024 al afirmar que Bukele “está mandando a todos sus criminales, sus narcotraficantes, la gente que tiene en la cárcel… a Estados Unidos”. El mensaje surtió efecto. Ya de vuelta en la Casa Blanca y decidido a acelerar las expulsiones de migrantes indocumentados, Trump obtuvo de Bukele el compromiso de recibir vuelos de deportados y confinarlos en su megacárcel. El Salvador también ha aceptado nacionales de terceros países expulsados por Estados Unidos, incluidos venezolanos señalados de integrar el Tren de Aragua.
A diferencia de Biden, Trump no ha intentado frenar sus derivas autoritarias: la reciente detención de la defensora de derechos humanos Ruth López solo recibió tibias protestas del Departamento de Estado (Department of State). Bukele es el único líder latinoamericano recibido formalmente en la Casa Blanca desde el regreso de Trump, quien lo elogió: “Nos está ayudando y lo agradecemos”. Donald Trump Jr. asistió a su segunda toma de posesión.
En el Washington de Trump, Bukele navega con viento a favor. Persisten, no obstante, versiones de que su Gobierno pacta con las pandillas para que sigan en negocios como el narcotráfico internacional a cambio de aceptar el encarcelamiento masivo de sus bases.
Milei se suma a la guerra contra lo “woke”
La ideología libertaria de Javier Milei lo mantenía, al principio, en los márgenes de la política argentina. El hartazgo con el deterioro económico le abrió las puertas del poder. Desde que asumió, a comienzos de 2024, su severo ajuste fiscal domó la inflación, aunque la sociedad soporta el rigor del plan de austeridad.
Al igual que Bukele, Milei cultiva su relación con Trump, cimentada en el rol de ambos como “outsiders”. Se vieron en la Conferencia de Acción Política Conservadora (CPAC) en febrero de 2024 y nuevamente en noviembre, en Mar-a-Lago, donde Milei calificó el retorno de Trump como “el mayor regreso político de la historia” y fue aclamado a su vez como “a MAGA person”. Asistió a la segunda investidura de Trump en Washington y mantiene lazos con figuras de su órbita, como Steve Bannon —“lo adoramos”, dijo— y Elon Musk, a quien Milei obsequió una motosierra, emblema de su campaña para achicar el Estado, durante la CPAC de 2025.
En economía ambos discrepan de forma profunda. Milei, fiel a su credo libertario, defiende el libre comercio; Trump lo detesta. El argentino impulsó un tratado de libre comercio con Estados Unidos sin éxito y ni siquiera logró conversaciones para mitigar los aranceles vigentes.
En otros frentes marchan al unísono. Milei se ve a sí mismo dentro del liderazgo global de la derecha, junto con Giorgia Meloni y Viktor Orbán. Siguió a Estados Unidos en retirarse de la Organización Mundial de la Salud (WHO) y ha sugerido salir del Acuerdo de París sobre el cambio climático. En las Naciones Unidas votó con Washington contra una resolución que exigía la retirada rusa de Ucrania y ha endurecido su diatriba contra todo lo que huela a “woke”, desde el aborto hasta la “ideología de género”.
Trump ha ayudado a Buenos Aires en un frente crucial: la negociación con el Fondo Monetario Internacional (IMF). Cuando se cerró el último acuerdo, que inyecta 20 000 millones de dólares, la prensa porteña atribuyó el éxito a la relación Milei-Trump. Sin duda, el aval de Washington fue indispensable.
Con todo, Milei despliega un programa de reformas draconiano que le confiere credibilidad propia ante el IMF. Se benefició, sí, de un gesto clave del Gobierno de Trump: la visita de la secretaria del Tesoro, Bessent, que aquietó a los mercados cuando el desembolso del Fondo se demoraba. Conviene recordar, empero, que pese a la distancia ideológica, la administración Biden también fue, en líneas generales, cooperativa con la Argentina de Milei.
Bolsonaro necesita ayuda
El ex capitán Jair Bolsonaro, cuyo mandato (2019-2022) coincidió con el primer gobierno de Trump, hoy enfrenta cargos penales por su presunta participación en planes golpistas tras perder la reelección. Cuando estaba en el poder forjó una estrecha relación con Trump y disfrutaba del mote de “el Trump del trópico”.
Fue recibido en la Casa Blanca, donde invocó la defensa de “la familia tradicional y el respeto a Dios creador frente a la ideología de género y lo políticamente correcto”. La sintonía produjo acuerdos de alcance limitado: mayor acceso mutuo en el comercio agrícola, el uso estadounidense de la base espacial de Alcántara y la, más bien simbólica, designación de Brasil como “Aliado Principal extra-OTAN”.
Con Biden el vínculo se enfrió: la Casa Blanca objetaba su autoritarismo y su hostilidad hacia la agenda ambiental e indígena. En 2022, con la economía aún resfriada tras la COVID-19, Bolsonaro buscó la reelección frente a Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. En vísperas de los comicios, Washington temía que no aceptara una derrota. El secretario de Defensa, Lloyd Austin, y el director de la CIA, William Burns, viajaron a Brasil para recordar a los militares la necesidad de respetar el resultado.
Tras la victoria de Lula, una turba antilulista tomó los edificios de los tres poderes en Brasilia. Salió a la luz que altos oficiales habían conspirado —con la anuencia o al menos la complacencia de Bolsonaro— para un golpe militar. Ahora esos oficiales y el propio ex presidente enfrentan procesos impulsados con firmeza por el juez del Supremo Tribunal Federal Alexandre de Moraes. Una condena podría inhabilitarlo para 2026 e incluso enviarlo a prisión.
El diputado Eduardo Bolsonaro viajó a Estados Unidos en busca de apoyo para una amnistía general; el Congreso brasileño la debate, aunque por ahora no prospera.
Circulan versiones de que Washington estudia sancionar a De Moraes con la Ley Magnitsky (Magnitsky Act) —congelándole cuentas— y restringirle la visa, después de que multara a X, de Elon Musk, y a Rumble, plataforma predilecta de la ultraderecha. Incluso si se aplican, esas medidas difícilmente descarrilen la causa contra Bolsonaro.
Los límites de la amistad
Otros líderes conservadores de la región también cortejan a Trump. El ecuatoriano Daniel Noboa, como Bukele, prometió frenar la violencia y luego sacó a los militares a la calle y ordenó detenciones masivas. En busca de la reelección en 2025 se reunió con Trump en Mar-a-Lago días antes del balotaje. Ofreció permitir que aviones antidrogas de Estados Unidos vuelvan a operar en Ecuador, como hasta 2009. Pero ha dejado claro que no seguirá el modelo salvadoreño de recibir deportados de terceros países.
En Panamá, José Raúl Mulino lidia con las amenazas de Trump de “retomar” el Canal. Para desactivar la tensión no renovó los contratos de empresas chinas que operaban instalaciones portuarias, pero el vínculo sigue tenso, máxime después de que Washington habría cancelado las visas de ex presidentes y otras figuras prominentes del país.
El lazo entre Trump y la derecha populista latinoamericana mezcla afinidad ideológica, intereses nacionales y —en el caso de Bolsonaro— la necesidad de salvar el pellejo. Trump y su círculo se sienten atraídos por la idea de un movimiento global contra la vieja socialdemocracia; en América Latina, como en Europa del Este, esa bandera ha encontrado terreno fértil.
En la agenda de Trump sobresale la mano dura contra la inmigración irregular proveniente de la región. De los tres líderes analizados, el vínculo más sólido es con Bukele, el más dispuesto a ayudar en esa prioridad estadounidense. Mientras las cárceles salvadoreñas sigan disponibles para los deportados de Estados Unidos, Bukele gozará de un lugar privilegiado en Washington.
The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: https://jstribune.com/sanders-trump-and-the-latin-american-right/